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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores ways in which a government can
capitalize on the mistakes or intrinsic weaknesses of a Marxist
based revolution. To accept as inevitable the capitulation of
a government to a revolutionary movement denies the very
foundations of modern civilization. If we accept that govern-
ments have a right, even a duty, to survive then we must
aggressively devise ways by which that government can defend
itself against internal aggressions. From a historical pers-
pective, revolutions are as old as civilization itself. The
spectacle of the first unpopular government in the dawn of
history sowed the seeds of its revolutionary destruction that
followed. This thesis contends that by studying historical
revolutionary movements, specifically Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary movements, a government can actually arm itself
against them. With this knowledge the government should be
able to devise ways to contain or disperse the energy of a
revolution and rechannel that energy into path-ways more
acceptable to the government.
At the end of World War II, the United States was the most
powerful nation in the world, with a flexible response capa-
bility and diverse limited war capabilities. The counterforce
puissance of the United States, and the American resolve to
halt the spread of Communism, culminated in the drafting of NSC
68 which obligated the United States to combat Communist

aggression worldwide. In the years that followed the NSC 68
call to action, Communist aggression has been vaguely defined
as almost anything the Soviet Union supports. Foreign govern-
ment leaders were quick to discover that the inclusion of the
words "ant i -Commun i St " in any request for aid from the United
States was sure to increase their chances of securing that aid.
And, spreading the ant i -Commun i st gospel, the United States be-
came involved in bi- and multilateral treaties worldwide to
contain the spread of Communism. As the active partner in
these treaties, the United States spent billions of d-o liars in
the name of ant
i
-Communi sm. This mass i ve expendi tu re proved
particularly effective in areas where American national power
was brought easily to bear. Our enormous airlift capability
suggested our successful intervention in the 1946-48 Berlin
Blockade crisis. The 19bU-53 Korean War allowed us to use
troops and World War II equipment to best advantage; our mas-
sive financial empire and technological advantage created the
ICBM and submarine ballistic missile forces that later forced
the Soviet Union to back down in the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.
The United States has been ineffective largely in those in-
stances where the enemy refused to meet us openly on the battle
field. In Vietnam we defeated the enemy on the battlefield
time after time, but ultimately we lost the war,l We lost that
war because the enemy was bringing to us a war that we did not
understand. Although more properly classified as a civil war,
the Vietnamese conflict began as a revolutionary movement.^

There have been many successful Marxist-Leninst revolutions
since World War II. China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and many others
are examples of Marxist-Leninist revolutions that the United
States, and the governments it supported, were unable to subdue
If the United States is serious about containing Communism, it
must first be able to recognize its enemy in every form. Im-
plicit in this thesis is the recognition and certainty that
Marxist-Leninist revolutions are prey to inherent weaknesses
that can be exploited by both the United States and its client
governments. By studying Ma rxi s
t
-Leni n i s t theory and the
revolutions it has inspired, it should be possible to discern
flaws in the overall structure of revolutionary movements.
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II. REVOLUTIONS AND TYRANNY
"There is no subjugation so perfect as that which keeps
the appearance of freedom, because in that way one
captures volition itself." Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
In the civilized world, the concept of true freedom does
not exist; for civilization implies codes and laws, and laws
imply constraints on behavior.^ If constraints on behavior
deny true freedom, then freedom is a misnomer, an illusion that
cannot be attained. Yet freedom was incorporated into every
revolutionary movement that ever flourished. Historically, one
man's freedom has often been another man's chains. Societies
have evolved social norms that their members are expected to
follow. 2 By conforming to these norms, the members of a
society have, in effect, relinquished their personal freedoms
and subjugated these freedoms to a higher law. In that sense,
freedom is interpreted as that degree of comfort experienced by
an individual within his social class. When the limits imposed
by a society on its individuals are perceived to be too strict,
or too confining, then individual freedom is perceived as
having been lost. When this perception is widely shared, the
individual senses a discomfort with the system and will attempt
to change his condition. Within the same system, if enough
individuals feel discomfort a collective will is developed
which nurtures the seeds of future revolutions. These revolu-
tionary seeds carry within them social norms that are
acceptable to the discomfitted individuals. These new social
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norms, imposed by a successful revolution, become the new
chains that bind individuals in the new society. Continuing
this logic, revolutions are manifestations of normative behavior
and their nature is cyclic. If this is true, then attempting
to prevent revolutions would be futile. However, inherent in
the concept of civilization is the belief that laws are above
man and that these laws should shape and govern man's actions.
The formulation and enforcement of these laws requires a
central authority capable of carrying out the will of the
greater society. T-h i s central authority has come to be called
government, and governments have been either legitimate or
illegitimate depending on the perceptions of the society they
represented .
A legitimate government has the support of the majority of
the people whom it represents. As long as people perceive
their government representing their best interests, that
government will remain in power. However, when the majority of
the people perceive their government misrepresenting them, then
that government becomes illegitimate. The more illegitimate a
government, the greater force and coercion it must use to
remain in power. Hence, an illegitimate government cannot re-
main in power unless it has the power to force itself upon the
people. Ironically, the illegitimacy that spawns the use of
force to subjugate the people to its will creates even greater
illegitimacy. Theoretically, there is a limit to how great





While the illegitimate government appears to enjoy every
advantage with its growing force, in reality that force proves
to be a major disadvantage. It is usually comprised of
military arms and manpower which are not inexpensive and must
be supported financially by the very people whom these arms and
personnel are subjugating.-^ An added taxation on the people's
resources creates a number of disadvantages for a government:
(1) it increases the distance between the classes of a given
society; the haves and the have-nots, (2) it lowers the stan-
dard of liv-ing of the masses and makes their existence harder
to achieve with each passing day, and (3) it increases the dis-
content experienced by the masses at any particular time.
Another major disadvantage of maintaining a large force of men
under arms is that these men are drawn from the populace. They
are trained in the skills of war and population control, and
when they return to their homes a growing wealth of military
knowledge is transferred to the populace.^ The third major
disadvantage a government faces when it allows its force to
grow too big is that eventually it becomes financially
unmanageable. At this point the government has no recourse but
to seek outside aid to maintain its present and future expected
increased force levels. By seeking outside aid the government
dilutes its autonomy within the international system and/or
mortgages its financial future. The above conditions indicate
that increased force levels may not be advantageous for a
government that is trying to control its populace. Therefore,
12

let us examine other methods by which illegitimate governments
have attempted to enforce control over their people.
Political terror has been used with great effectiveness by
many established Communist regimes over the last forty years. ^
Political terror, though, incorporates some major disadvan-
tages. ° For our purposes a government and its people represent
a pyramid. The base of the pyramid represents the people of a
nation, the apex represents the controlling governmental struc-
ture, and the sidewalls are the force lines the government uses
to' keep the people in line. By utilizing political terror the
government, in effect, is chopping away at its very foun-
dations. While political terror appears superficially to
achieve its initial aims, every purge, midnight disappearance,
and business that is forced to close effectively decreases the
income producing capability of the pyramid base. If the purges
become too extreme the supporting structure of the government
will be weakened beyond repair.' More specifically, those
individuals who are usually the first targets of a government
purge or midnight disappearance, are among the more productive
individuals in society. They are the educated and intellectuals
of a class, those who own the businesses being hurt by these
practices, and the future leaders of the country (as repre-
sented by college students).^ As these productive individuals
are removed from the economy the effective taxation increase on
the remaining populace creates increasing discontent. Never-
theless, historically, political terror has been used
13

effectively and is advocated by Communist leaders as a means of
popul at i on cont rol . ^
Governmental control of news media has been effected by
almost every illegitimate government. The aim of this control
is to prevent the people from obtaining news that would be
detrimental to the government in power. Although control is
initially effective, over a long period the population in-
creasingly disregards the news media as a source of true news.-'-*^
The people distrust the controlled news, with extreme conse-
quences for the illegitimate government in later years.
Stringent monetary controls instituted by illegitimate
governments usually have adverse effects such as increasing
inflation and widespread shortages in the economy. These in-
crease the discontent felt by the populace, and the government
again becomes the target for their anger.
Illegitimate governments have imposed travel restrictions
on their people to contain their movements, increase economic
productivity, and decrease their awareness of events in their
country. This effectively makes the population more
susceptible to revolutionary propaganda and control by revo-
1 u t i onary f o rces
.
An illegitimate government's hold upon the populace is
tenuous at best. It creates conditions that separates itself
from the populace; the illegitimacy translates to a foreign
occupation power, and the armed forces of the government become
an occupation a rmy . ' ^ Under these volatile yet fertile
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conditions, the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary marches in,
armed with the tools of revolution. He discovers that the
illegitimate government - transitioned to an occupation
government - has done most of the work for him. That portion
of the populace not openly hostile to the government is
apathetic to it, and the small percentage of people who
actively support the government is denounced by the Marxist
revolutionary as enemies of the people. If a legitimate
government has the support of its people then any revolutionary
movement must be perceived by them as a disease which must be
eradi cat ed . ^2 A revolutionary movement living within the
framework of an illegitimate government often is perceived by
the people as having that legitimacy which the government lost.
This perception often has adverse consequences for the ille-
gitimate government. If we accept that an illegitimate govern-
ment is doomed to failure then we should also agree that no
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III. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
History discloses that the first socialist experiments
occurred in Sumaria about 2100 B.C. Babylonia, Egypt, Rome,
China, Peru, and other states all experimented with socialism
at one time or another.^ Modern Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
thought, however, has its foundations in the writing of Engels,
Marx and Lenin. Karl Marx (born 1818) and Freidrich Engels
(born 1820) were both students of revolutionary movements.
They lived when the American and French Revolutions had re-
cently ended, and revolutionary fervor was sweeping across the
European continent. Karl Marx became convinced that the social
aspect in revolution was the most important.^ Studying the
French Revolution, he concluded that freedom and poverty were
incompatible. He determined that poverty was a condition
caused by the exploitation of the masses by the ruling class
and was thus a political, not a natural phenomenon. ^ This
ruling class (the bourgeois) were the capitalist exploiters who
were oppressing the peasantry (proletariat). Marx and Engels
both attached no shame to revolution and even emphasized
leadership and management in revolutionary movements.^ In 1848,
Marx and Engels issued the Communist Manifesto, an appeal to
the workers of all counties to unite in the struggle against
capitalist exploitation. Marx concluded it was inevitable that
capitalist society would be transformed into a socialist
society, exclusively from the economic law of the movement of
17

contemporary society.^ Thus, Marx and Engels laid the foun-
dations of future Marxist-Leninist revolutionary thought.
In 1898 George Plekhanov introduced Marxism into Russia.^
He began a moderate program of socialist reform, soon taken
over by the radical wing under the leadership of Lenin -
whose real name was Vladimir I. Ulianov. Lenin, a school
inspector's son, was to transmute Marxist theory into action.
In Soviet socialist history, 1905 was marked by great
hostility. On January 22, Bloody Sunday, the first bloodshed
occurred in the emergence of a workers faction in the socialist
movement of the Soviet Union. For the rest of the year strikes
occurred all over the Soviet Union. And on December 22-January
21, 1906 an insurrection of the workers in Moscow took place,
characterized by violent street fighting. Soviet troops re-
mained loyal to the Tsar and prevented the revolution from suc-
ceeding.^ These events convinced Lenin that general political
strikes were ineffective in bringing about a revolution. He
determined that to be successful a revolution must engender the
popular support of the troops supporting the government. ° Over
the next ten years Lenin became convinced that the only pos-
bile way to a revolutionary success and socialism was through
violence. This conviction was a major step forward in
revolutionary thought.
On November 6, 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution occurred.
With the consolidation of power by the socialists in the Soviet
Union, Lenin had accomplished what Marx had never dreamed
18

of - a socialist revolution through violent means. Marx
theorized that socialism would inevitably prevail over
capitalism, but what Marx never suspected was that it could be
achieved through violence. Another element in revolutionary
thought was thus introduced by Lenin.
The consolidation of power by socialists in the Soviet
Union proved that the socialist dream could be attained by
violence and that a government could be forged. Other
revolutionaries were to study the Marxist-Leninist writings,
the socialist revolution in the Soviet Union, and profit from
the knowledge gained in those experiences. The primary
benefactor was a young Chinese named Mao Tse-Tung.
Marx and Lenin both felt that the working class must be
enlisted to bring about a socialist revolution. The Chinese
Communists in Shanghai also tried a Leni ni st -sty 1 ed revolution
during the 1920's. It failed, and young Mao Tse-Tung
interpreted this failure and postulated that a peasant -based
revolution had more chance of success in China than did a
Leninist-styled revolution.^ Mao concluded that, while a
Leninist-styled revolution involving urban centers was probably
the quickest way to bring about a socialist revolution, a
peasant-based revolution in the Chinese countryside could bring
about the same defeat of capitalists in power. Central to the
idea of peasant-based revolution was that peasants would
control the countryside and eventually encircle the urban
centers. The urban centers would then wither from lack of
19

support and supplies. This is what eventually happened in
China under Mao Tse-Tung's guidance.
An inherent characteristic of human nature is that when an
individual develops an idea his first desire is to share it
with others. Lenin, and later Mao, displayed this
characteristic and were even accused of exporting revolution.
Both Lenin and Mao believed that one of the primary
elements for supporting successful revolution was an organized
socialist party within the country. One man was to prove them
wrong in coming years - Fidel Castro. Cuba was the first
country to have a Marxist-Leninist revolution without a
Communist party to support the revolutionary st ruggl e . ''^ The
old Communist party in Cuba played a marginal role in the
insurrection and, after Castro's victory, was only one of
several revolutionary organizations within the new political
system. (The most important group was Castro's Twenty-Sixth of
July movement.) The Cuban success led Fidel Castro to believe
it unnecessary to have any Communist support organization to
sustain a revolutionary movement. This gave rise to a new
theory of revolution. Regis Debray, a French journalist who
had become a Cuban revolutionary, developed a theory of
revolution which downplayed the significance of Communist
parties and instead elevated the role of the guerrilla army.^^
In his sense, in Latin America the gun was all-powerful.
Cuba's foreign policies in the late 1960's and the early 1970's
were aimed at exporting revolution to Latin American states.
20

specifically the organization of American states (OAS). While
the Soviet Union did not accept the strategy as totally
effective, it provided Fidel Castro the material support he
needed to export his revolution. The insurrectionist
activities of the late sixties that Cuba exported to other
countries met with little success. Latin American guerrillas,
even when well-armed, were no match for the counter-insurgency
forces deployed against them. The U. S. Alliance for Progress,
and the subsequent aid to Latin American countries, spelled the
death of insurgency after i nsu rgency . ^2
One of Fidel Castro's more brilliant disciples was Che
Guevara. Ironically, Che Guevara's death in Bolivia in 1967
prompted a reevaluation of this new Cuban strategy. By 1969,
Cuba had abandoned its policy of material support for guerrilla
movements throughout Latin America. While the guerrilla move-
ments supported by Cuba in the late sixties failed to achieve
revolutionary success, several Latin American countries were
becoming more Communist oriented. In Chile, in 1970, a coalition
of Communist and socialists won the popular elections; in Peru
the military government appeared to be installing a Communist
revolution, and in Argentina the Peronist left had emerged as
a powerful force. All three countries defied the Organization
of American States sanctions against Cuba and reestablished
diplomatic and economic ties. For Cuba this was a major step




During the 1970's, Cuba became the major training ground of
revolutionists and insurrectionists throughout Latin Anerica.^-^
But Cuba's image throughout Latin America was very much
softened and more Latin American states accepted Cuba and Fidel
Castro. In 1975 and 1976, Cuba sent 36,000 surrogate combat
troops to Angola to help the popular movement for liberation.
In 1978 Cuban troops were in Ethiopia defending the Ogaden
region from Somali "aggression." By the late 1970's and early
1980's Cuba and the Soviet Union were cooperating in several
African and Middle Eastern countries. In 1979 Cuba once again
furnished material and weaponry to Latin America. Revolu-
tionaries in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua were
to benefit from this assistance. Following the victory of the
Sandinista revolutionary movement in Nicaragua, Cuban
technicians and advisors were in Nicaragua in late 1979.^^ The
revolution revived Fidel Castro's hope for revolutionary
solutions in Central America, especially in El Salvador and
Guatemala. In 1979 and 1980 Cuba provided limited arms and
material to guerrilla forces in El Salvador, channeled through
Nicaragua. By late 1980 and 1981 the Cubans had significantly
increased their logistical support to El Salvadoran guerrillas.
Evidence does not exist that Cubans are sending military forces
to Guatemala but the potential is very real. Cuban adventures
into the Caribbean have been increasing in recent years but the





From 1946 to 1954 another Marxist-Leninst -Maoist- inspired
revolution was taking place, this time in Southeast Asia. Ho
Chi Minh and his guerrilla commander Vo Nguyen Giap first
attempted a Leninist-style revolution in the cities of Hanoi
and Haiphong.l^ This early urban revolutionary attempt by Ho
Chi Minh proved unsuccessful and in late 1946 the Vietminh took
to the jungle. They were prepared for a protracted war because
the revolutionary organization had been in place for two years.
Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap decided that their revolution
must be peasant based, adopting the tactics of Mao Tse-Tung in
China. ^^ In 1954 the revolution ended successfully. Vietnam
was partitioned, in part because the Chinese were concerned
about the prospect of Russian influence in North Vietnam.
French forces withdrew from South Vietnam and Emperor Bao Dai
was replaced by Prime Minister Diem, who immediately asked for
American aid and advisors to build up his armed forces. In
1955, the U.S. began to reorganize the South Vietnamese Army,
and by 1959 there were about 400 American advisors in Vietnam.
At the time of the partition Ho Chi Minh ordered Communist
cadres to begin the creation of village organizations in the
south. 1^ North Vietnamese agents recruited clandestine
guerrilla groups from amongst the villagers. The first major
acts of terrorism began in 1957, with government officials
being killed, as well as informers. ^^ In 1964 U.S. combat
troops landed and by July 1965 there were seventy-five thousand
American troops in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese regular army
was expanded and, by 1967, ninety per cent of the armed men
23

fighting the Americans in South Vietnam were North Vietnamese
regular soldiers. ^^ Peace negotiations began in May 1968 and
by June 1969 U.S. combat units began their withdrawal. In 1975
all Indochina was in Communist hands.
The period from 194b to 196b also witnessed some classic
counter-revolutionary successes such as in the Philippines,
from 19b0 to 1953, in Malaya, from 1948 to 1960, and the much
older Greek Communist revolutionary attempt. By analyzing the
successful Marxist-Leninist revolutions - and their failures -
we may discover the inherent recognizable characteristics
that identify Marxist revolutions as well as the inherent
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IV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF REVOLUTION
Since 1935 there have been many successful Marxist-
Leninist revolutions, but not eyery country has faced the
threat of Marxist revolution. Some countries provide fertile
environments for Marxist revolutionary ideology to root while
other countries do not. To understand this phenomenon, it is
necessary to refer to the writings of Marx and Lenin to
discover the roots of Marxist ideology and revolution.
Karl Marx believed that poverty was a political, not a
natural phenomenon; the result of violence and violation, not a
scarcity of materials.^ If poverty was to generate
revolutions, then it would be necessary to translate the
economic causes of poverty into political factors and explain
them in political terms.^ Once these economic factors were
converted to political factors, then it would be easy to show
that the masses were actually held in subjugation by the ruling
class, represented by capitalists and imperialists.-^ Marx
believed that this subjugation by the capitalist class would
continue until the masses had awakened to their plight. Once
awakened, the working classes would inevitably arise, over-
throw the capitalist system, and achieve a true socialist
state. Marx believed that the eventual downfall of capitalism
and the rise of socialism was inevitable.
Lenin's experience in the Russian revolution convinced him
that revolution through peaceful means was impossible and that
26

violent means were necessary to attain the socialist state. ^
This led to one of Lenin's more famous statements, "If a war is
the continuation of politics by other means, the continuation
of national liberation politics in the colonies will inevitably
take the form of national wars against imperialism."^ Lenin
believed that, if poverty was not a social condition but a
political factor, as Marx stated, and if political solutions
could not be secured by peaceful means, then war was the logical
means to achieve political solutions. Lenin viewed rebellion
of the masses as a national war of libertion against the
imperialist forces and he determined that all wars of
liberation must be violent.^ Extending Lenin's logic a step
further, if all wars are wars of national liberation against
imperialist forces - and wars are inevitable - then the export
of revolution is justified.
Throughout history, ideas have been stronger than military
forces, and ideas that survive the test of time become the
common heritage of mankind. To the poverty stricken people of
the world the revelations of Marx and Lenin inspired new hope.
Poverty no longer was accepted as a way of life, but as the
result of an oppressive government violating the people. The
government's tarnished image transformed it into an illegiti-
mate government, and thus gave the people the right to destroy
that government. Since peaceful solutions would not bring
abput the required changes, violent means received the veneer
of acceptabi 1 i ty .
27

A. THE BODY (ENVIRONMENT)
In search of those environments which breed Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary activity, we should begin with history.
Utilizing Ma rxi st -Len i n i st revolutionary theory, we might
expect to find poverty among the masses and an oppressive
ruling elite. We should expect great disparity between the
wealth of the ruling elite and the poverty of the masses.
Since these governments would likely be oppressive, the ruling
elite would be versed in the uses of power. Therefore, we
should seek out a ruling elite; either an established family in
power over the years, a foreign occupation force, a military
dictatorship, or a colonial government.
Tsar Nicholas II ruled Russia from 1894 to 1917, and his
downfall ended hundreds of years of dynastic rule. This dynasty
was despotic and had been described by other countries as
autocratic. James Buchanan reported to Andrew Jackson in 1332
that "... here there is no freedom of the press, no public
opinion ... in short, we live in the calm of despotism."' Many
believed that Russia could be ruled no other way. James
Buchanan again wrote to Andrew Jackson in 1833, ..."the most
ardent republican, after having resided here for one year,
would be clearly convinced that the mass of the people,
composed as it is of ignorant and superstitious barbarians who
are also slaves, is not fit for political freedom."^
Buchanan's Russia was ruled by Tsar Nicholas I, whose son,
Nicholas II, was described as an intelligent but weak ruler,
deeply devoted to the memory of his father. Nicholas II could
28

not rule Russia, as his father had, with an iron fist.
Nicholas II's main accomplishment was to slowly bring Russia
into the industrial society of Europe. His other
accomplishment was to embroil Russia in World War I. On the
eve of the Bolshevik revolution, losses of Russian troops in
World War I were estimated at 15,000,000 men. The war damaged
an already weak economy and subjected the people to shortages
and deprivation.^ The Soviet economy, never well developed,
was at low ebb. From this environment Lenin emerged with his
workers' class revolution. The masses, represented by the
workers, overthrew the ruling elite, represented by the Tsar.
The wealthy aristocracy and landowners were destroyed and their
holdings redistributed.
General Chiang Kai-Shek's rise to power as head of the
nationalist government of China, began on April 18, 1926.-^'^
Chiang and other conservative members of the Kuomintang (KMT,
the ruling political party) split with leftists at Hankow, and
established a new provisional government at Nanking.
Previously, the Communist party and the Kuomintang had
maintained an uneasy truce. Chiang, who had the support of
most wealthy people, gained power and immediately set about
destroying his opposition. Chinese Communists remember 1927 as
the year of the blood bath.
In April 1927 Chinese Communist party membership reached a
peak of 58,000 members. By year end there were only 10,000
members left.-^^ At this time Mao Tse-Tung determined that a
29

peasant revolt was the only way to a successful revolution.
Mao and Chu Teh organized a Communist base of operations in
Kiangsi and Fukien. From 1927 to 1934, Mao and Chu repeatedly
defended themselves against attacks from the nationalist
gove rnment . ^ 2 During 1934 and 1935, the Communists were forced
to retreat, and began their famous "long march" through
Kueichou and Szechwan into northern Shensi. While, on the
surface, the Communists appeared to be losing during this
period, they had a great increase in membership.^-^ In 1929 the
Great Depression began and China was as affected by this as the
rest of the world. Poverty, already bad in China, became
intolerable and many Chinese joined the burgeoning Communist
movement. On July 7, 1937 Japan invaded China and Mao Tse-Tung
and Chu Teh leaders of the Communist forces, put themselves
under the control of the nationalist government to fight the
i nvaders . '^ The Chinese Communists, with their experience of
warfare against the nationalist government, proved effective
against the Japanese. As their successes grew so did their
reputation as defenders of the Chinese people. By 1938, it was
obvious to the Japanese that, while they could capture large
cities and important communications, they could not control the
countryside. With the defeat of the Japanese in World War II,
the Chinese Communists again focused their attention on the
nationalist government. Over the next three and one-half
years, Mao and his Communist forces gained control of the
countryside and laid seige to the cities. On January 31, 1949,
the Communists entered Peking and established a new government,
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the Peoples Republic of China. General Chiang Kai-Shek
retreated to Taiwan.
Japanese occupation was to prove useful to other
Communist strategies as well. Since 1944 the Vietminh Com-
munists were active in the rebellion against Japanese occupa-
tion, which was clearly an illegitimate government, and the
Communist rebels won the support of their people from the
onset. After World War II the French moved to reoccupy their
former colonies. One illegitimate government was replaced by
another. Ho Chi Minh, and his guerrilla commander Vo Nguyen
Giap, had built a large control network throughout the
country. ^^ In 1946 and 1949 Vietminh guerrilla activity
increased steadily. In 1950 the Vietminh used China as an
active sanctuary beyond Vietnam's borders. In 1951 Giap made a
strategic error, meeting the French army on the battlefield;
and was defeated.!^ During 1952 Giap and Ho Chi Minh returned
to guerrilla warfare. By 1954 the Vietminh controlled the
countryside and the French were under seige in the major urban
areas and around the deltas. Even powerful French army columns
were not safe.^'' In 1954 Giap and his soldiers trapped the
French army at Dien Bien Phu, forcing their surrender, which
led soon after to the French withdrawal from Vietnam,
Another Communist insurgency was born in the Philippines
under Japanese occupation. Clearly, the Japanese occupation
was illegitimate and Communist forces were supported by the
Filipino people as well as their allies. After World War II,
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these Communists revolutionaries turned their attention towards
the Philippine government. The Hukbalahap rebellion in the
Philippines was unsuccessful, largely because Ramon Magsaysay,
first as Defense Minister and then as President of the
Philippines, instituted land reform and provided adequate
security to protect those under the government's care.''-^
Magsaysay convinced the people that life under the government
offered far more than life under the Communists. By 1954 the
Communist insurgency in the Philippines had collapsed through
1 ack of i nterest .
The Communist insurgents in Malaya benefited by the
illegitimacy of a Japanese occupation. Like other Communist
parties during World War II, the Malayans had built and
organized a strong guerrilla force organized during wartime.
The British gave active support to this resistance movement
located in the rural areas. The leader of the revolutionary
movement was a Chinese named Chin Peng. The Malayan Communist
party organization was almost exclusively Chinese in origin and
this alienated most of the popul at i on . ^^ After World War II,
the British reestablished their colonies in Malaya. In 1945
the Malayan Communists attempted an urban revolution along
Leninist patterns, employing strikes and riots, but by 1948
this had clearly failed. ^0 Concurrently, the British stepped
up their offensive against the Communists and by 1953 had
destroyed the dynamism of the revolution. The revolution
continued through 1960, but only sporadically and in isolated
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pockets of the Peninsula. In 1955 the British gave Malaya its
f reedom .
On April 23, 1940 the remnant Greek armies surrendered
unconditionally to the Germans and the Italians. ^^ The
following occupation gave rise to a Communist revolutionary
army in Greece. In October 1944 Athens was occupied by allied
forces. World War II had left Greece in economic ruin and many
Greek citizens were starving. The Germans and Italians were
first seen as an illegitimate government that occupied Greece
and then British occupation forces routed and replaced them.
British occupation forces ended the civil war that developed
between different Greek factions, one of which was the
Communist revolutionary faction. In Janaury 1945 the Greek
Civil War was ended by a truce between the British occupation
forces and leftist forces (Communist forces) opposing British
intervention.^^ From May 1946 to October 1949, several
thousand Communist guerrillas engaged in extensive guerrilla
warfare throughout Greece, which eventually became another
civil war. In December 1947 General Markos, leader of an
estimated 20,000 guerrillas, established the First Provisional
Government of Free Greece, followed three days later by the
dissolution of the Communist party. ^^ On October 16 after
three years of fighting the second civil war ended in the
defeat of the rebel forces. This was partly due to American
aid, but the major element in the cessation of hostilities was
Tito's closing the Yugoslav frontier to the revolutionaries. ^^
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On September 5, 1933, Fulgencio Batista became dictator of
Cuba. The reign of terror that followed, the state's seizure
of sugar and mining industries, agricultural schools, and the
redistribution of land, threw Cuba into turmoil. ^^ This
oppressive regime created support among the populace for the
revolution that followed. Fidel Castro established his
guerrilla base among the independent squatter peasants of
Oriente Province. From this base, Castro mobilized broad
support from among the Cuban population, which were at least as
anti-Batista as they were pro-Castro. On May 20, 1957 Fidel
Castro appealed to the United States to stop sending arms to
Batista. On May 30, Batista declared an intensified war
against the rebel troops in Oriente. In reply, on January 1,
1959 Castro's forces captured Santa Clara, Santiago, and two
days later Havana feil.^°
In Bolivia on July 21, 1946 President Gualberto Villarroel
was killed and his government overthrown by rebellious workers,
soldiers, and students. The following January, Enrique
Hertzog, leader of the Republican Socialist Union Party was
elected president. On October 19, 1949 Hertzog resigned
because of ill health and was succeeded by Vice-President
Manerto Urri ol agoi t a . On April 10, 1950 the Communist party
was outlawed in Bolivia. ^^
Any thesis dealing with Marxist revolutionary movements
must explain the Indonesian Communist party's illfated
attempts at domination of Indonesia. This revolutionary
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movement was different from any of the revolutionary movements
so far discussed. In 1923, the PKI (Asia's first Communist
party) was founded by a group of Dutch radicals^^ who, within
six years, had organized to where armed revolt commenced
against Dutch colonialism. The revolution was badly organized,
and mo St of the participants had little conception of
Ma rxi St -Leni ni St doctrine. These Communists were ill prepared,
ill armed, misled and misused by the Communist hard core of the
PKI. On November 13, 1926 revolt broke out against the Dutch
colonial government. In the early morning hours the Communist
party seized the telephone and telegraph building in Satavia.
By dawn the Dutch army had retaken the strong point and, by
November 19, had defeated the revolution. The main reason for
its defeat was that the masses failed to respond to the
Communist summons to rise and revolt. ^^ During the 1930s and
through World War II the PKI aligned itself with the Dutch in
its fight against world fascism. However, in 1947 the PKI
returned to the far left. After World War II, the Dutch
attempted to reestablish their control of Indonesia. Fighting
ensued between the Dutch and the Indonesian army and, on
September 18, 1948 while the Indonesian army was fighting the
Dutch, the PKI staged a coup at Madiun in East Java. The
Indonesian Army found itself trapped between the Dutch on one
front and the Communists on the other. To the Indonesian army
this was a stab in the back which its army general staff never
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forgot, and they crushed the Communist revolt. The Communists
admitted that the most important factor in their defeat was the
lack of support by the people. -^^ Secondly, the Communists
admitted another mistake - the killings and atrocities
committed against adversaries within the areas they controlled.
From 1948 through the 1950s the Communist party in Indonesia
gained increasing popular support. President Sukarno was
forced to recognize the Communist Party and, in the inter-
national milieu, he was perceived as having leftist inclina-
tions.
On December 29, 1964 Malaya was elected to a one-year term
as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United
Nations. Sukarno reacted by withdrawing Indonesia's membership
in the U.N.-^-'- During 1965, harassment of the United States
government and business personnel reached new heights. On
March 19, the government nationalized American owned oil
companies and Royal Dutch Shell Oil. During the following
weeks other American concerns were nationalized in Indonesia.
Even the Peace Corps was pressured into leaving. ^^ By 1964, the
consumer price index was twenty-five times as high as it had
been in 1959. No salaried employee, military or civilian,
could subsist on his pay alone after 1962. -^-^ On August 17,
1965, President Sukarno addressed an Indonesian Independence
Day gathering and remarked that he could not live forever and
did not know who would succeed him as leader of the country.
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On September 30, an abortive coup was launched by the PKI
and this proved disastrous for the Communist movement in
Indonesia. Rebel forces seized the radio station the next day
and announced that they had formed a revolutionary council and
cabinet. Within a day, General Suharto, commander of the army
strategic reserve, recaptured the radio station. In the next
two days, disclosures that the coup conspirators had murdered
six generals on the night of September 30 and critically
wounded one general's five year old daughter, turned
popular opinion against the Communi st s . -^"^ By December
ant i -C ommu n i St mobs were engaged in mass executions of
Communists and Communist sympathizers. Observers estimated
that over 200,000 people were killed during this malevolent
period. -^^ Apparently, Sukarno had given tacit support to the
PKI bid for power and, for this, within six months of the coup
Sukarno was deprived of effective control of the go vernment . -^^
Indonesia created a new ant i -Communi st leadership headed by
acting president General Suharto.
Nicaragua is the largest nation in Central America but one
of the least populated. It gained its independence in 1838 but
since 19U0 U.S. Marines have twice occupied Nicaragua, the last
time from 1926 to 1933, to restore order following civil
strife. At the end of 1933, the Marines were replaced by the
newly created Nicaraguan National Guard headed by General
Anastasio Somoza Garcia. Within two years General Somoza had
acquired control of the country.'^' General Somoza is reputed
to have ordered the execution of a rural patriot named Augusto
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Cesar Sandino, who had fought both the U.S. Marines and the
National Guard. Using the National Guard as a power base.
General Somoza created a family dynasty that was to rule for
the next forty-three years. On February 2, 1947 Leonardo
Arguello was elected president to succeed Somoza. General
Somoza supported Arguello as a possible figurehead but when the
new president proved independent he was removed. On March 25,
1950 General Somoza reassumed the presidency. An opposition
group with Marxist leanings was organized and claimed the name
Sandinista, from the dead patriot. ^^ On September 29, 1956
President Somoza died of gunshot wounds, and his son, Luis, was
unanimously elected to serve until May, 1957, and then was
reelected for a six-year term. In February 1967 General
Anastasio Somoza Oebayle was elected president, assuring the
dominance of the Somoza dynasty. Until well into the 1970s the
Sandinista guerrillas carried out many spectacular raids
throughout the country. Although these raids publicized the
Sandinista movement, it lacked popular support. In 1977,
Somoza Debayle declared that "the Sandinistas are finished -
divided and conquered by me."^^
In 1978, the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
Cardenal, the editor and publisher of the opposition La Prensa,
galvanized popular support for the Sandinista movement. Joined
by an increasing number of middle class scholars and
professionals, the Sandinistas benefited from a nationwide
disenchantment with the Somoza regime. In 1978 an unsuccessful
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coup attempt against the government of Somoza was successfully
quelled by the government. In 1979 the Sandinista movement
announced the final push against Somoza and by late 1979
General Somoza's government had been toppled. ^^ The Sandinista
government discovered that the national treasury had no more
than three million dollars and that the government owed 1,6
billion to the international monetary system. Nicaragua had
been milked by the Somoza dynasty and its people,
long-suffering from poverty and illiteracy, were victims of a
corrupt regime.
In all countries where Marxist revolutions have occurred
the governments have been either colonial governments,
occupation governments, family ruled governments, or military
governments. From the people's perspective, all these
governments were, in effect, occupation governments and the
governmental forces that sustained these governments were
occupation forces in the people's eyes. These governments had
the military, the financial backing, and the international
support to quell revolutionary movements, but ultimately none
of these governments was successful. In all the countries
enduring Marxist revolutions, poverty was widespread and
people's rights had been oppressed for many years. In these
fertile conditions, the Marxist revolutionary movements
galvanized popular support. One singular fact that emerges is
all ultimately successful Marxist insurgencies had experienced
failure before eventually attaining success.
39

B. THE HEAD (LEADERS)
Lenin stated that, "to be successful, insurrection must
rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the
advanced class. "^^ This grain of truth is the basis of all
revolutions. It is not the peasant masses that control a
revolution; it is the ruling elite that controls a revolution,
in opposition to another ruling elite. ^^ This thesis
distinguishes between the masses of a country and its elite.
The masses, the peasants, are widely separated in social status
from the intellectuals, governmental politicians, the
bureaucracy and the professionals.
Lenin's mother was a physician's daughter, his father a
respected administrator of the provincial school district, and
a member of the minor Russian nobility. ^-^ Mao Tse-Tung was
u n i ve rs i ty -educ ated , the son of a prosperous middle class
peasant family in Hunan Province where the penetration of
western missionary and economic influence was strong. ^^ Ho Chi
Minh derived from the French-educated intelligencia,^ Vo
Nguyen Giap from the same source and with the highest academic
degree available in French Indochina, a doctorate in law.^°
The father of Fidel and Raul Castro was a rich plantation
farmer and a member of Cuba's upper class. Fidel graduated
from the University of Havana and practiced law before 1953.^'
Che Guevara was a medical doctor, son of an Argentine
architect. ^^ The leadership of Malaya's Communist insurgency
after World War II was drawn almost exclusively from the ranks
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of the intellectuals and urban professionals.^^ The Communist
movements in the Philippines and Indonesia were both
characterized by leadership that derived its origins from the
upper class, Tomas Borge Martinez, sole surviving founder of
the Sandinis-ta movement, identified with the intellectual
class. Jaime Wheelock, another influential Sandinista leader,
also had a wide educational background. ^^ It is interesting
that, Magasaysay, who was given credit for defeating the
Philipine Communist insurgency, was from the agrarian masses,
not the ru 1 i ng elite.
It is evident that the actual leaders of Marxist inspired
revolutions are not of the people. These elite who inspire
Marxist revolutions are almost identical to the elite who are
overthrown. If, in countries where Marxist revolutions have
been successful, the peasantry is characterized as illiterate
and their existence slave-like, then one could logically assume
that the only people who would understand new ideas from
without - and have the time to experiment with implementing
these new ideas - would be members of the upper class who had
been afforded educational opportunities and exposed to the
international system.
An aspect that recurs in Marxist revolutions is that many
of the leaders were at one time incarcerated by the very regime
they later overthrew. Lenin was imprisoned under the Tsarist
Regime, released and exiled. Fidel Castro was sentenced to
prison by Batista in Cuba. Many prominent members of the
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Indonesian Communist movement, the North Vietnamese Communist
movement and the Sandinista Communist movement also languished
in prison. This implies that the governments that once had
restrained the revolutionaries (who would later claim success)
were unable to identify and recognize the severity of the
th reats .
C. THE CIRCULATION (THE GEOGRAPHY)
Many authors on revolution have noted that geography plays
a key role in the success of a revolution. *^^ Geographical
sanctuaries are developed by a revolutionary movement which
provides the foundation of future successes. In these remote
sanctuaries, the revolutionary movements develop a strong
administrative government and supply system that enable them
to continue their fight against the occupying government.
Hidden in remote areas, the revolutionary movements are
relatively safe from governmental attack. From these bases the
revolutionary movements spread their tentacles among the
population and effect increasing control of the countryside.
The necessity for geographical isolation and the role of
sanctuary has been postulated for such countries as Nicaragua,
Cuba, North Vietnam, China, and Malaya. Logically, one would
not expect to find revolutionary movements in countries where
the land is relatively flat, or where there are no sanctuaries
within the country, or neighboring countries. This is not the
case. In the American Revolution there were major pitched
battles on open countryside and, while guerrilla movements were
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successful in forests, major battles were won on the open
battlefield. Lawrence of Arabia led a revolution against
colonial rule in relatively flat terrain. The Russian
Revolution occurred mainly in major urban areas. The Chinese
Communist revolutionary movement was driven from its
sanctuaries and had to undertake the "long march". These
revolutionary movements were successful without remote
geographical sanctuaries, which indicates that they are not
important foundations of revolution. It indicates something
significantly different. Perhaps it is not the isolation of
the revolutionary movement from the government forces that is
important, but the government's isolation from the people that
is s i gn i f i cant
.
If a government is perceived as illegitimate in the eyes of
the people, then it has effectively isolated itself from the
very people it seeks to control. If the government has
isolated itself from the people, then the revolutionary
movement, as it gains legitimacy in the eyes of the people, is
able to move through the people at will without interference
from government or from the population. This ability to move
through the people is the sanctuary of a revolutionary
movement. The guerrilla who works by day and attacks by night
is effectively hidden in the very bowels of the government
itself. Both Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh commented on this
ability to move through the people as one of the greatest
assets of a revolution.^^ If sanctuary is crea-ted by the
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government's isolation from the people, this indicates that any
site in the country could become an acceptable point of entry
for arms smuggling and any place in the country could serve as
a base of operations for the revolutionary group. The best
examples today are the opposition movements in Afghanistan, and
the accompanying arms smuggling; and the opposition group and
arms smuggling in El Salvador. Theoretically, there is a time
when the growth of the revolutionary army limits its mobility.
At that point, geographical sanctuary gains importance.
While the illegitimacy of a government appears to be a
major factor, two other factors must be considered; lines of
communication and transportation. Communication is defined as
two-way communication -- from the people to the government and
back -- through credible channels. Transportation is defined
as that mobility available to people throughout the country.
It may be supplied through systems of roadways, railways, air
transportation, or other means.
The best recent example of the communication concept is the
British experience in Malaya against Communist insurgency
forces. When the British were requested to assist the
Malaysian government, they took over the government
organization and allowed it to free its personnel for the army
in the field. At the same time, the British government created
a police force that was organized, supported, and manned by the
people. It was to report on abuses, by the army, of the
civilian population, and locate insurgency groups for the
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government. Because of this two-way function the police force
became a credible avenue of communication between the people
and the government . ^-^
When the successful strategic hamlet concept was developed
in Malaya, this rural police force became an integral part of
it. As strategic hamlets were developed, police forces and
people from the locale were a part of each. They became part
of a cohesive network of strongholds throughout the country.
In South Vietnam, the strategic hamlet concept failed to
achieve the British success. ^^ Reasons for this failure were
advanced by many authors, but the principal reason they failed
was the lack of a viable two-way communication link between the
people and the government. In Vietnam the armed forces, the
police forces, and the intelligence forces, were government
controlled and the people could not identify with them. The
forces were in the countryside not to protect the people but to
protect the government. When the strategic hamlet concept was
instituted, instead of forming a cohesive network of
strongholds throughout the country the strategic hamlets became
individual strongholds under seige by Communist insurgency
forces . ^^
In the Philippines, Mags ay say listened to the demands of
the people in the rural areas and responded to their demands by
instituting the reforms they required. In the people's eyes,
this was a credible two-way link between the people and the
government. The Communist insurgency in the Philippines failed
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because the government heard the people and instituted the
reforms that they desired. Two-way communications are a must
for a government to stay in power.
Military commanders recognize the importance of lines of
transportation, for resupply of troops in the forward battle
areas and for transportation to and beyond the forward battle
areas. Many political leaders do not grasp the importance of
transportation lines. In the countries discussed thus far, all
the transportation lines connected major urban areas and
effectively bypassed rural areas. This isolated the rural from
the urban people, and isolated them from the government.
Because the transportation lines were not developed, it was
difficult for the government to maintain a presence in areas
where the Communist insurgency was growing. This presence, so
necessary for successful governmental action against an
insurgency, can be maintained only if transportation is
developed from the urban areas to the rural areas. Without
transportation lines already in place, the geographical
sanctuary provided late stage guerrilla movements, when they
reach a size where mobility is limited, is available in the
coun t ry si de .
Illegitimate governments, in effect, isolate themselves
from the people -- creating the very sanctuary that the
revolutionary movement requires to achieve success. Lines of
communication and lines of transportation can effectively
reduce these sanctuary, areas within a country by spreading the
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government's influence. The reduction of sanctuary areas
permits the government to focus its energy on several small
areas rather than one huge area, increasing its effectiveness
against the insurgency. Use of government forces to build
these roads and these lines of communications is often
perceived by the people as active government interest in the
livelihood and concerns of the deep rural areas.
D. THE TRANSFUSION (EXTERNAL SUPPORT)
Some writers in revolutionary theory have identified
external support as a requirement for a revolution to succeed.
They cite such revolutions as the American revolution, the
Chinese Communist revolution, the South Vietnamese revolution,
and more recently, revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
They aver that without external support a revolutionary
movement cannot be successful, and they cite the Philippines,
Greece, and the Malay Peninsula.^^ In the Malay Peninsula,
British authorities effectively isolated the Communist
insurgency forces from outside aid before destroying them. In
the Philippines, geographical isolation was the downfall of the
Communist insurgency movement, while in Greece the geographical
isolation of Greece, caused by Yugoslav withdrawal of aid and
support for the Communist insurgency, led to the downfall of
that revolutionary movement. However, a review of the data
supporting the Communist revolutionary movements noted in this
thesis indicates that external support is not a requirement
and, sometimes, is not a factor. In the Russian revolution, it
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was not external support that won the revolution for the Soviet
workers; rather, it was the army's transfer of loyalty to the
revolutionary side.' In Cuba, Fidel Castro received almost no
external support until after he had achieved a successful
revolution. At this point he negotiated with the Soviet Union
for massive arms shipments. ^^ In Nicaragua, the Sandinista
revolutionary movement received almost no external support
until after they had successfully seized the country. Then,
the Soviet Union, through Cuba, started supplying the arms that
made Nicaragua the power it is in Central America. ^^ In the
Philippines and the Malay Peninsula, it was not the
insurgency's inability to get external support that led to
their downfall. It was the inability of the Communist
revolutionary movement to gain popular support.
In other than Marxist inspired revolutionary movements
external support does not always constitute a factor. The
French revolution, the English revolution and, most recently,
the revolution in Iran against the Shah, all indicate that the
internal will of the people dictated the results. It may be
concluded that external aid is of minor importance to a
successful revolution.
E. THE ANTIBODIES (THE ARMY )
Ideally, the armed forces of a government are designed to
defend it against external aggression. Realistically, both
legitimate and illegitimate governments recognize that these
same forces can be used to enforce their will upon the people.
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If the armed forces are unwavering in their loyalty to the
government and, if they are strong enough, then the
government's will can be imposed on the people. The most
dangerous moment for a government occurs when either its
military forces are no longer strong enough to defeat the
insurrectionist forces within the country, or their loyalty
wavers. No one enjoys losing, and military forces are no
different. Historically, when military forces perceived that
"the correlation of forces" has turned to the people, they have
first wavered, then often sided with the people. Lenin
identifies this wavering of the armed forces as a primary
factor in a successful revolution. ^^ In the Soviet October 17
revolution, the armed forces of the Tsar wavered, and many
divisions sided with the populace.
Outside of Marxist revolutions, the Shah of Iran and his
military forces were ample to keep the population under
control. It was when the army wavered that the Shah's power
was lost. In examining colonial or occupation forces, it is
that point at which those forces perceive it is no longer in
their interest to remain that exemplifies the change. When a
colonial government withdraws, a power vacuum is created. Into
that power vacuum the strongest force moves, i.e., the
revolutionary force.
Specifically in Marxist revolutions, it is important that
the wavering of the armed forces that carry a revolutionary
movement to power is often fatal for the military commanders of
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those forces. After every successful Marxist revolution,
military leaders have either been purged or imprisoned, and
many intelligence representatives eliminated. Hence, in the
context of a Marxist revolution, it is unhealthy for the armed
forces of a country to waver toward a Communist insurgency.
Clearly, they should support the government, whether it be
legitimate or illegitimate.
F. THE DNA (THE STRUCTURE)
Almost all authors in the field of revolutions agree that
one of the major strengths of a Communist revolution is its
organizational structure. Evidence indicates that the
structure of a Communist movement is more organized than the
government that it seeks to replace. ^^ It is this
organizational structure that is so difficult for an
illegitimate government to combat, since it is less well
organized. One of the major factors in the British success in
Malaya was that they assumed the organization of the Malaysian
government while it fought the insurgency. This smooth flowing
organization, rigidly controlled by the British, allowed the
government to utilize effectively its logistic support,
material supply, and armed forces.
In successful Marxist revolutions, the country was
characterized by a government supported by a large fumbling
bureaucracy. This fumbling bureaucracy, hobbled by red tape,
bribery and corruption, led to a government incapable of
managing its material, logistic or arms supplies. This denied
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support to military commanders in the field, making military
and political decisions on a day-to-day basis by themselves or,
even worse, coping with decisions by leaders at the apex who
lacked information on events in the field. This inefficient
bureaucracy has two adverse effects: It increases the
isolation of the government from the people, since they cannot
attain what they desire through the government. And, each
layer of ineptitude, each layer of corruption and bribery, and
each layer of incompetence, has a multiplicative effect on the
overall weakness of the government. If these effects are not
reversed, if the bumbling bureaucracy is not reorganized, and
if the corruption and bribery is not abated, then the
government becomes so weakened that it cannot defend against an
adversary from within. These governments become easy targets
for the Marxist revolutionary because of his organization, his
identification with the people, and his perception within the
country as a legitimate force. This strengthens the image of
the Marxist revolutionary who is strongly organized and
legitimate, against a government that is illegitimate,
disorganized and incompetent. One of the best defenses against
Marxist revolution is a government with excellent
organizational foundations.
G. THE SHOCK TREATMENT (GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TERRORISM)
Terrorism and guerrilla warfare have two things in common:
They are both used by a smaller, weaker force against a
larger and stronger force, and their purpose is to provide the
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image of an impotent enemy. Revolutionary movements, because
they are small, and because they are initially weak, use
terrorism and guerrilla warfare to their great advantage. The
role of terrorism by Marxist revolutionaries in the opening
stages of revolution is well documented. During the Sandinista
revolution many kidnappings, bank robberies, and assassinations
of public officials took place, while in Cuba public officials
were targets of open warfare. In South Vietnam and in China
numerous public officials were assassinated or cowed by Marxist
revolutionaries. This demoralized the government forces as
well as the people. For, if the government could not protect
itself, how could it hope to protect the people? As usual, the
people are very perceptive on such matters. Government
leaders, to protect the government itself, must institute ever
more repressive measures against the people. They, of course,
are the innocent victims and the greater the repression the
greater the resentment against the government in power. Acts
of terror also draw international attention to developments
within the country, and this international attention can
oftimes develop external support for the revolutionary
movement. Acts of terrorism are difficult for a government to
counteract because of their unpredictability and the unknown
individuals involved. Often terror is a two-edged sword. For
instance, when a kidnapping has taken place and ransom money is
demanded, this ransom usually supports the revolutionary
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movement with arms and logistics. So a government is hurt
twice by any act of terrorism.
Because guerrilla warfare is used by a weaker force
attacking a stronger force, it has been used in every communist
insurrection. Guerrilla forces may strike at the heart of the
government, any time, any place, anywhere, with seeming
impunity. The government, not knowing where the next attack is
aimed, must spread its forces thinly. This thinning of
government forces makes them more susceptible to guerrilla
attacks, which become more effective. Thus the cycle is formed
and becomes vicious. As the guerrilla movement becomes more
successful, the government finds itself under seige. Its
forces can move between large cities and forts only with large
mechanized support forces. The state of seige isolates the
government from the rural countryside, and Marxist
revolutionary movements use this isolation to broaden their
power base through the countryside.
An insidious aspect of both guerrilla warfare and terrorism
is that they feed upon the government itself. Terrorism,
through extortion, gains money for the revolutionary movement.
It cows the people and makes them more tractable to the Marxist
revolutionaries. It renders the government impotent in the
eyes of the people. Guerrilla warfare is often characterized
by an army working by day and striking by night. This army,
working within the government, is drawing financial support
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Any government supported by the people is legitimate, and
any insurrection against this government will be viewed by them
as a cancer that must be destroyed. A government which does
not enjoy the support of the people loses its legitimacy and
any insurrection against this government gains legitimacy by
its very opposition. So, it is necessary for any government,
legitimate or otherwise, to maintain the facade of legitimacy
in the eyes of the people. The foundations of this facade are
the government's organizational structure, and the lines of
communication and transportation throughout the countryside.
1 . Organization
A strong organizational structure enhances a govern-
ment's capabilities for leadership. It also intensifies a
government's capability to react to internal stimuli. A swift
reaction to internal stimuli implies more effective control of
the populace by the government, and enhances the stability of
the government in the eyes of the people, reinforcing its
legitimacy. A second benefit of a well organized government
is that the people can interact with it on a real time basis
and this interaction heightens their perception of a responsive
government. The strength of a communist revolutionary movement
is that it is better organized than the government it replaces.
Therefore, one may conclude that a well organized, responsive
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governmental structure is the foundation of any successful
defense against communist insurgency.
2
. Transportation
Military leaders must be able to move government forces
to isolated areas within the country. For this, lines of
transportation are critical to a government's survival.^ A
viable network of lines of transportation throughout a country
not only enhances the mobility of the army but encourages that
of the people as well. The enhanced mobility increases the
potential for economic interaction between communities. An
increased potential for economic interaction between
communities, if effectively utilized, promotes an increase in
the standard of living among the people.^ The better standard
of living will be attributed to the government and thus enhance
its legitimacy. The major advantage of effective lines of
transportation throughout a country is that a responsive, well
organized governmental structure spreads its influence
throughout and is perceived by the people as part of their
daily lives.
3 . Communi cation
Equally important are effective two-way communications
throughout a country. People view their government's
capability to communicate effectively as of paramount
importance in augmenting its stability and legitimacy. It is
not required that people can communicate with this government,
58

only that the people perceive that the two-way communication
exists. A police force staffed by indigenes would intensify
the perception of two-way communications between people and
government, stabilizing the legitimacy of that government.-^
This police network, a secondary network of the government,
increases its intelligence gathering capabilities."^ With better
intelligence, the government can respond effectively to
internal crises. The population's identification with the
police only increases the government's capabilities.
4. Vi si bi 1 i ty
To perpetuate the facade of legitimacy, the government
must maintain visibility among the people. It must be positive
and must identify with the people. Use of government forces to
build public works projects, construct transportation lines,
and increase communications capabilities throughout the country
enhances the government's prestige, and thus its legitimacy in
the eyes of the people. Using the armed forces in this manner
diffuses the organizational capability of the government. The
government should also initiate an organization similar to the
Peace Corps, with which the people can immediately identify and
perceive as having beneficial effects for the country. The
government and this Peace Corps should be charged with bringing
low cost technology to the rural areas to upgrade the standard
of living. "Back to the land" publications, popularized in the





Special Police and Intelligence Forces
While government forces should strive to maintain high
positive visibility, special police forces and Intelligence
organizations should conversely maintain low visibility among
the people. Interrogations and incarcerations should receive
the absolute minimum of publicity. These forces should not be
readily identifiable by the public from uniforms, insignia or
any other trademarks. Apprehensions and arrests should be
effected with minimum public disturbance.
6 . The News Medi a
An illegitimate government has more to gain by
manipulation of the news media than by stifling it. The news
media should maintain the appearance of a public forum, working
in the interests of the people. This reputation established,
the government can publicize its efforts on behalf of the
nation, thus increasing its visibility.
If an increase in positive visibility is beneficial to
the government, then greater negative visibility of the
opposition is also beneficial. News media journalists should
accompany government forces when they deal with acts of
terrorism and extreme guerrilla warfare. The destruction and
carnage wreaked by these insurrectionists can be portrayed as
acts against the people, not acts against the government.
Concurrently, the news media should be encouraged to publicize
the positive visibility aspects of the government.
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Once the foregoing is achieved, the government should
not limit the news media to urban phenomena. It should
encourage the spread of the news media and local di st s ri but i on
centers should be established in every community. The
government should consider subsidizing the news network
initially until a solidly entrenched, viable news media is
active. This will increase the visibility of the government by
providing another two-way communication channel; not from the
people to the government, or from the government to the people,
but from both to the majority.
B. THE WAR
Any government facing an insurgency, should recognize that
it is at war. Once war is declared the government must
mobilize every capability at its command to insure it achieves
victory. A specific, coherent response by the government to
the threat presented by insurgencies must be developed.
1 . Terrori sm
The dual role of terrorism in insurgency is to
increase the image of government impotency in the national
view, and to subsidize the revolutionary movement. To be
effective, terrorism must be perceived by the people as acts
against the government. For the government to be effective it
must subvert the purpose of these terrorist acts and redirect
them at the people. Thereafter, terrorist acts will be
perceived by the people as acts against them, not against the
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government. The news media can play an instrumental role in
providing this perception to the people. Concerted action by
the governmental structure and the news media can galvanize the
opposition of the people through revulsion against senseless
violence. If terrorism can be portrayed as acts against the
people, and if a specific organization can be identified as
responsible, then the people have a target upon which to vent
their hostility. This hostility toward the terrorist group
protects not only the people but serves the secondary purpose
of protecting the government in power.
To achieve this capability requires a highly organized
government structure, with positive visibility in the national
view, utilizing an entrenched news media to galvanize public
support. The role of intelligence, not only of the special
police but also of the two-way communications links, can
f aci 1 i tate this.
2 . Guerrilla Wa r f a re
No guerrilla warfare can succeed without at least tacit
support from the people. A guerrilla movement gains strength
from its ability to move through the people and operate in the
bowels of government. This can occur only if the government is
perceived as illegitimate. Therefore, in its war against
guerrillas, the government must recognize that its thrust must
be to convince the people that the guerrilla movement is
illegitimate. Once accomplished, the people become the
62

greatest protectors of the government. Guerrilla warfare is
not won on the battlefields but in the minds of the people,^
and if popular will can be galvanized, as it was in Indonesia
against the Communists, then the guerrilla movement will lack
sanctuary and be ineffective.
3
.
Ext erna 1 Suppo rt
We have established that external support is not a
prerequisite to successful revolution. However, external
support can be an annoyance to the government. Once the
dynamism of the people is directed against the revolutionary
movement, external support has no secure avenues to enter the
country. The two-way communications links, so vital to a
government, allows intelligence to filter from the populace to
the government, revealing the location of entry points for
illegal weapons and support. '^ With this information government




Once a government recognizes that an insurgency is a
war, captured insurgents become prisoners of war. Evidence
from previous Communist insurgencies indicates that released
insurgent prisoners oftimes destroy the government that
released them. Understanding this, the government should
attempt to destroy the opposition when it can. The Soviet
Union and the North Vietnamese have gained some success with
their "re-education camps" (concentration camps). ^ Through
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these camps, both countries have effectively neutralized all
opposition by placing this internal threat where the only
viable release is death. These Communist nations have achieved
this surreptitiously because of their complete control over the
news media. This thesis indicated that news media control is
not in a government's best interest. However, if the will of
the people is galvanized into an ant i -revol u t i ona ry fervor, and
if the visibility of these "re-education camps" is low, then
tacit approval of the population might be forthcoming.
The leadership of communist insurrections has been
identified as elitist, while the soldiers of a revolution come
from the people.^ Execution of captured insurgent leaders
removes any future threat. Conversely, the government should
recognize that soldiers of the revolution are from the people
and different methods should be employed to control them.
In Malaya and the Philippines, captured insurgents were treated
fairly by the government and later released. This had a
positive effect on the legitimate image portrayed by the
government and a negative effect on the legitimacy of the
revolutionary movement.
5 . Shock Tactics
The government should maximize its strength by subtle
manipulation of the emotional will of the people. In
Indonesia, publicizing the death of five generals and the
critical wounding of one five-year old girl galvanized the
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country into an anti-Communist fervor. The ensuing slaughter
of Communists, insured the government's power for years to
come. A government at war with an insurgent group should
recognize that any atrocity, any bloodshed, can be used to stir
the people into anti-Communist fervor. The government should
publicize these acts when they occur and encourage the news
media to intensify their bloodthirsty aspects. This increases




The leadership of a Marxist movement comes from the
elite and not from the people. Government should recognize
this weakness and exploit it at every opportunity. The people
should be aware that they are being manipulated by elitists.
They should be educated in the more brutal aspects of a
successful Communist revolution. The purges, the concentration
camps, and the elimination of the military officer corps should
be publicized. In countries where religion plays a major role,
propaganda should emphasize the ant i -rel i gi ous nature of
Communist movements.^ Through these methods, the Marxist
leadership loses credibility and thus legitimacy, in the eyes
of its followers and the indigenous population.
7 Propaganda
While propaganda enhances government control of a
nation, it should be perceived as the truth in the eyes of the
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people. With this goal in mind, government should approach
propaganda from the people's perspective. Destruction of
businesses, transportation and communications, and power
facilities lead to economic disarray, which destabilizes the
people's standard of living. These aspects should be
publicized and the nation must be aware that every act of
violence reduces their standard of living and dilutes their
hopes. Properly utilized, propaganda can focus the people's
anger on a Marxist insurgency and not against the government,
unable to protect the facilities being destroyed.
Since religion and Communism are often antithetical,
religious propaganda should be utilized. The powers of good
and evil should be invoked with good on the government side and
evil portrayed by the Marxist revolutionary. The government
should appear peace loving, conservative, and responsive while
the Marxist insurgency must be portrayed as bloodthirsty,
radical and totalitarian.
8. Discipline of the Troops
Among the foundations of Marxist revolutionary faith is
that the people's army is never perceived as mistreating the
civilian population. ^^ Goods procured are paid for and people
are treated with civility and respect. The government should
insure that its armed forces reflect this image always. When
violations of discipline occur, the people should witness the




army's stature, it enhances the legitimacy of this element of
the go ve rnment .
9 . Ref rms
If a government can afford to comply with specific
demands by the people, reforms should be instituted. These
reinforce the two-way communications channel that the people
perceive they have with the government. The reforms should not
jeopardize the government nor the economic power structure of
that country. Agrarian land reforms can be accomplished
without threatening major land holders. Economic reforms can
be commenced while allowing those wielding economic power to
derive benefits from the economy. It is necessary only that
the population perceive that the government is attentive to
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. CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLICY
A conclusion of this thesis is that a government that can-
not maintain its legitimacy, in the eyes of its population, is
doomed. If the people are aroused, and their will is
galvanized against a government in power, as it was against the
Shah of Iran, then no military force can prevent its downfall.
Only a government responsive to the needs of the people, which
appears in touch with the people, and maintains a facade of
legitimacy (as seen by those people), can hope to remain in
power. While specific actions may be undertaken by the govern-
ment to maintain its power for a time, that government should
recognize that its existence feeds on the power and the energy
of its people. If the body (the people) does not support the
head (the government) then the body is beheaded. It is
imperative that policy makers first determine precisely whether
the government they intend to support is legitimate or
i 1 legi timate.
Under international law, the United States must negotiate
with another recognized government. Nowhere in international
law theory is it explicitly stated that the United States is
obliged to suppo rt a government in power. The United States
should be sensitive, and recognize that a government is no more
than an organized structure representative of its people. When
people no longer support that government then it no longer
represents the people. If illegitimate governments are doomed.
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then our support of illegitimate governments dooms us as well
to be always on the losing side. Cries of ant i -Ameri can i sm,
anti-imperialism, ant i -colonialism, all directed at the United
States, have caused disharmony in our relationships with
country after country. If the United States is required by its
national security objectives to support an illegitimate
government then we should seek the most effective way to
support that government. An important corollary is that the
U.S. resolve to support that government must be strong and
convincing. If an illegitimate government requests aid from
the United States to fight an insurgency, we should demand
control over how that aid is distributed. In South Vietnam,
President Diem requested military aid but denied the United
States the ability to oversee other aspects of support. The
United States should have required access to several levels of
the organizational structure of the government. We should have
Insured that transportation and communication lines were
developed and that cohesive communications networks were
available for the people. We should have insisted that reform
programs be initiated and that participation by the people in
their government was institutionalized. In short, we should
have dealt with the real power of that nation; the people. We
were doomed in South Vietnam, not by our military weakness, but
by our inability to recognize where our true interests and
strengths lay. Military strength is important on the
battlefield but in revolutions the battle is for the minds of
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the people. Recognizing this, the United States should
generate new tactics to confront an insurgency against an
illegitimate government we support.
In the past, the United States has hesitated to take this
approach for fear that our interests would not be achieved.
When our support has failed, we have been accused not of inter-
fering with the government but of intefering with the
government of the people. With alternate, sensitive,
responsive modes of contact, ant i -Ameri cani sm, ant i -col oni al i sm
and ant i -i mperi al i sm might be silenced or redirected and the
United States could move more freely. Perhaps the United
States might view the international system as a nation-to-
nation relationship rather than a govern me nt-to-government
relationship, and thus could more accurately determine the will
of the people of a particular nation, and develop its. foreign
policy accordingly.
The United States is a government of the people, by the
people and for the people - and every American believes this in
his heart. We must recognize that every government is a
government of the people and by the people, if not necessarily
for the people. Just as our revolutionary origins helped us
evolve into the nation we are, other nations are evolving. Our
leaders have tended to view this evolution as a destabilization
of the international system, where United States influence was
concerned. Perhaps we should recognize that since we cannot
halt this evolution of a nation we could support it with resolve
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